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A HAGUE CONVENTION ON PARALLEL
PROCEEDINGS
Paul Herrup and Ronald A. Brand *
INTRODUCTION
Two of the most recent conventions produced by the Hague
Conference on Private International Law create frameworks
for transnational litigation in areas that clearly needed
development at a global level. The 2005 Convention on Choice
of Court Agreements regulates jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters in international cases in which an
exclusive choice of court agreement has been concluded. The
2019 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters applies to
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil
and commercial matters.
Both of the existing conventions resulted from a broader
project begun in the early 1990s, considering issues of
jurisdiction as well as the recognition and enforcement of
judgments. A consensus determination in 2001 that a
comprehensive treaty on jurisdiction and judgments
recognition was not possible allowed the Hague Conference to
focus on specific pieces of that broader project, and led to the
two existing conventions.
The question now facing the Hague Conference is whether
further international legal instruments can add to the
* Paul Herrup is member of the Pennsylvania Bar. Ronald A. Brand is the
Chancellor Mark A. Nordenberg University Professor and Academic Director of the
Center for International Legal Education at the University of Pittsburgh School of
Law. Both authors were members of the Experts Group and are current members of
the Working Group considering a convention on parallel proceedings at the Hague
Conference on Private International Law. This article is prepared entirely in their
personal capacity and should not be taken to represent the position of any delegation,
state, office, or institution.
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package in a manner that will solve other significant
problems raised by cross-border litigation — and solve them
well. It is our view that a convention that would purport to
require or prohibit national court jurisdiction in the first
instance (i.e., regulate “direct jurisdiction”) is neither feasible
nor desirable. There is a current and growing need, however,
for rules that address questions of parallel proceedings by
designating a “better forum” when courts in more than one
state are seized with the same or related claims under their
own jurisdictional rules.
GLOBAL MOBILITY AND GLOBAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
NEEDS
Any transnational litigation convention must be
measured against the progress of global communication and
transportation over the past quarter-century, and the near
certainty that the global mobility these developments
demonstrate will accelerate in the future. The resulting
combination of enhanced knowledge of opportunities across
borders and reduced transaction costs have brought an
unprecedented ability of people, goods, ideas, electrons, and
even microbes to move across borders, easily and cheaply.
This, in turn, has created social, cultural, and economic
connections, as well as the inevitable attendant disputes.
Not only is there a far greater number of persons engaged
in global activities, but the breadth, flexibility, and plasticity
of the relationships has proliferated. This includes new types
of family relationships, as well as new variations in
commercial relationships such as licensing and other
arrangements in areas including intellectual property rights
and data transmission.
This democratization of cross-border activities results in
an increase in the number of states with a significant
connection, legal or factual, to any given transaction or
relationship. For example, in the sale of goods, any stage in
the stream of commerce might well justify a jurisdictional
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connection, including the location of the advertisement for
sale, the contract offer, the contract acceptance, the initial
packaging of the goods, the loading of the first carrier for
transit, the export customs territory, the import customs
territory, the storage upon arrival in the import customs
territory, the unloading from the final carrier for transit, the
purchaser’s facility at destination, the bank through which
payment is made or financing is arranged, the office where
payment is received, or any other geographic activity
conducted by one or more of the parties to the transaction.
Each of these factors may be considered important to national
rules determining judicial jurisdiction, resulting in there
being courts in multiple states in which a legal action may be
filed when a dispute arises.
A CONVENTION REGULATING DIRECT JURISDICTION
The fact that there may be multiple states in which
jurisdiction for judicial settlement of a dispute exist for a
single cross-border relationship does not mean that it is
either necessary, or even possible, to prepare a convention
purporting to require or prohibit the exercise of jurisdiction
as a general matter by national courts. To the contrary, any
effort to prepare such a convention will fail — and is not
needed in order to improve the field of transnational
litigation.
Judicial jurisdiction is an attribute of national
sovereignty, and reflects differing appraisals of the proper
scope and qualities of a particular kind of exercise of state
power. Each state touched by an instance of global mobility
may have reasonable grounds from its own perspective to vest
its courts with jurisdiction over a resulting dispute, which
leads to the possibility of multiple reasonable fora. The mere
fact that one state’s jurisdictional nexus may differ from that
in another state does not necessarily make litigation in one of
those states better than in the other. Different states may
legitimately value different interests in determining access
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to, and protection in, their courts. Neither access to justice
nor due process is a finite, unchanging value, and efforts to
create rules that definitively limit either of them for global
purposes — regarding jurisdiction or any other concept — are
presumptuous at best, and likely to be destructive of the very
values they purport to champion in the long run.
Mechanical rules of jurisdiction, especially when based
upon nineteenth century notions of physical presence, can
result in a highly expensive and cumbersome fragmentation
of related litigation, with no guarantee that each piece of the
litigation will yield non-overlapping results, and with real
risks of inconsistent judgments. The oft-stated claim that
transactions require ex ante certainty as to jurisdiction is
belied by experience. Levels of economic activity in the United
States, whose jurisdictional rules allegedly are uncertain,
compare favorably to those in Europe, which does attempt to
provide rigid, ex ante jurisdictional rules.1
The European experience shows that, even on a regional
basis with a single court in control of interpretation of
jurisdictional rules, ex ante certainty cannot be achieved or
can be achieved only after extensive litigation and by creating
an artificial legal terrain disconnected from commercial and
other realities of mobility. One need only survey case activity
before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in
2020 and 2021 to illustrate and understand this problem in a
system of relatively homogenous states in a single region,
with a single court to provide definitive interpretation. In
April of 2020, Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona
issued his opinion in Verein für Konsumenteninformation v
Volkswagen AG, wrestling with tort jurisdiction and the
“place where the harmful event occurred” test of Article 7(2)
of the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation, in the “Dieselgate”
affair and the resulting products liability actions brought on
1 See, e.g., C.I. Jones, The Facts of Economic Growth, in 2A HANDBOOK OF
MACROECONOMICS 3, 35 figs. 24 & 25, 36 fig. 26 (John B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig eds.,
2016).
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behalf of automobile purchasers. His recommendation that
the place of injury (which applies in addition to the place-ofact test under CJEU interpretation), be “the place . . . where
the victim purchased the product from a third party,” was
qualified by a requirement that “the other circumstances
confirm the attribution of jurisdiction to the courts of that
State.”2 Moreover, “[t]hose circumstances must include, at all
events, one or more factors which enabled the defendant
reasonably to foresee that an action to establish civil liability
as a result of his or her actions might be brought against him
or her by future purchasers who acquire the product in that
place.” 3 In July of 2020, the court ultimately chose a more
limited test, providing that “where a manufacturer in a
Member State has unlawfully equipped its vehicles with
software that manipulates data relating to exhaust gas
emissions before those vehicles are purchased from a third
party in another Member State, the place where the damage
occurs is in that latter Member State.” 4 Even with the
rejection of Advocate General Campos Sánchez -Bordona’s
more complex test, consider the multiple complex factual
predicates to the court’s rule of interpretation:
-unlawfully
-equipped its vehicles
-with software
-that manipulates data
-relating to exhaust gas emissions
-before those vehicles are purchased
-from a third party
-in another Member State.

One need only think for a minute of how such decisions
would be made regarding a convention that applied on a
2 Opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona, Case C-343/19,
Verein fur Konsumenteninformation v. Volkswagen AG, ECLI:EU:C:2020:253, ¶ 81
(Apr. 2, 2020).
3 Id.
4 Judgment, Case C-343/19, Verein fur Konsumenteninformation v.
Volkswagen AG, ECLI:EU:C:2020:534, ¶ 41(July 9, 2020).
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global basis, without the homogeneity of the European
region, and where every national judicial system could enter
conflicting interpretations. The claimed predictability would
be non-existent as the world evolves and new types of claims
arise from new problems and new technology.
Other CJEU cases of 2020 and 2021 provide additional
examples of this problem. In LJ and Others v. Rina SpA, the
court entered the sticky area of jurisdiction when companies
assert sovereign immunity as a result of sovereign ownership
of an otherwise private company. The court’s conclusion that
“[t]he principle of customary international law concerning
immunity from jurisdiction does not preclude the national
court seised from exercising the jurisdiction provided for by
that regulation in a dispute relating to such an action, where
that court finds that such corporations have not had recourse
to public powers within the meaning of international law,” 5
requires very little imagination to realize the problems when
expanded to a global treaty context. Similar issues of
sovereignty and jurisdiction were raised in Belgische Staat v.
Movic BV, where the question involved whether Belgian
authorities, which had brought interlocutory proceedings
against a foreign corporation, were acting in a public or
private (commercial) manner and thus governed by the
jurisdictional rules of the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation.6
The case of Mittelbayerischer Verlag KG v. SM, decided on
June 17, 2021, again raised interpretation problems with
Article 7(2) of the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation, wrestling
with where the location of a claim falls for jurisdictional
purposes when the claim is that an individual’s personality
rights have been infringed by content published online on a
website. The court ruled that “the courts of the place in which
the centre of interests” of that person bring the claim could
claim jurisdiction under Article 7(2) “in respect of the entirety
5 Judgment, Case C-641/18, LG v. Rina SpA, ECLI:EU:C:2020:349, ¶ 61 (May
7, 2020).
6 See Judgment, Case C-73/19, Belgische Staat v. Movic BV,
ECLI:EU:C:2020:568, ¶¶ 23–24 (July 16, 2020).
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of the alleged damage, . . . only if that content contains
objective and verifiable elements which make it possible to
identify, directly or indirectly, that person as an individual.”7
One need not be very skilled in constructing hypotheticals to
understand how such issues and opinions could affect the
uniformity of application normally required in a Hague
Convention when multiple courts in contracting states have
final interpretive authority.
The Mittelbayerischer Verlag case brings to the forefront
the problems of the EU system, which breaks down
mechanical direct jurisdiction connecting factors by
separating contract jurisdiction from tort jurisdiction (a
process long ago discarded in common law legal pleading and
thus alien to common law practice), and prohibiting a court
with jurisdiction from granting full compensation for the
liability it is authorized to determine. Expanding that process
to a global realm and saving any hope that words in a
convention will lead to predictability and uniform
interpretation is a fool’s errand at best.
Perhaps the most telling single case in only the past two
years for a demonstration of the potential problems of a global
system of direct jurisdiction connecting factors based on the
EU model is the Obala case, decided on March 25, 2021. That
decision provides a triple interpretation hit at potential
global uniformity and complexity, determining that:
1) An action for recovery of a parking ticket fee is a “civil
and commercial matter” within Article 1(1) of the
Brussels I (Recast) Regulation;
2) A parking ticket is not a “tenancy of immovable
property” within Article 24(1) of the Brussels I (Recast)
Regulation; and

7 Judgment, Case C-800/19, Mittelbayerischer
ECLI:EU:C:2021:489, ¶ 47 (June 17, 2021).

Verlag
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3) A parking ticket is a contract for the provision of
services within Article 7(1)(b) of the Brussels I (Recast)
Regulation.8

The myriad potential problems for predictability and
uniformity of interpretation in a global convention with
similar rules are more than can be contemplated in the brief
length of this discussion.
The list above involves only some of the cases of the past
two years, demonstrating problems of interpretation and
technical evolution that would face a global convention built
upon wooden application of tests requiring mechanical direct
jurisdiction connecting factors. The critical factor for action
in the world is not ex ante jurisdictional certainty but a
reasonable basis of prediction of possible fora.
One of the principal goals of any Hague Convention
should be to improve the world of transnational litigation by
reducing the time and expense involved. The time and
expense wasted by litigants demonstrated in a relatively
small number of CJEU cases, from a relatively short period
of time, provide clear demonstration of the cliff the world
would be jumping off if similar rules of direct jurisdiction are
included in any new Hague Convention.
More important in any process of drafting a new legal
instrument, a convention purporting to regulate direct
jurisdiction is an exercise in solving a problem that has not
been identified. Not only can it be easily demonstrated that
any convention including direct required bases of national
jurisdiction in national courts would create innumerable
litigation problems, but those championing such a convention
have yet to identify any significant problems that have arisen
in real-life litigation that they seem to be trying to solve.
Indeed, the existence of multiple potential fora does not
appear to be a significant deterrent to transnational mobility.
The challenge generally is not to specify a single forum ex
8 Judgment, Case C-307/19, Obala i lučice d.o.o. v. NLB Leasing d.o.o.,
ECLI:EU:C:2021:236, ¶ 99 (Mar. 25, 2021).
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ante, but what to do in those cases in which litigation over
the same or related claims materializes in multiple fora. This
problem should be explored and investigated from the ground
up, rather than starting from well-entrenched positions that
are not necessary to the solution of the problem and tend to
add time, expense, and confusion in international litigation.
THE NEED FOR A CONVENTION OFFERING ASSISTANCE TO
COURTS WHEN PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS DO OCCUR
An increasing irritant in transnational civil litigation is
posed by situations in which multiple states assert
jurisdiction, each under its own law, over or related to the
same claim or set of claims. The traditional solution in many
common law countries is to let litigation proceed in multiple
countries, with resolution of the matter (or not) coming at the
stage of recognition and enforcement of the first judgment
issued by the various courts considering the matter. This
approach leads to a race to judgment, and may result in
duplicative litigation, significant additional expense for
litigants, and potential conflicting judgments. These
problems may be modulated by application of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, which usually requires a court to
balance a basket of factors and defer to proceedings in
another forum only if the other forum is clearly more
appropriate to resolve the dispute. 9
The traditional solution in many civil law states is to
rigidly prescribe and rank order jurisdictional bases and, if
nonetheless jurisdiction might subsist in multiple fora, then
apply a strict lis pendens rule, which bars consideration of a
claim or set of claims if another court was “seized” first. This
approach leads to a race to the courthouse and very artificial
strategic litigation, such as an anecdotally reported
9 See generally,Error! Main Document Only. Error! Main Document
Only.RONALD A. BRAND & SCOTT JABLONSKI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS: HISTORY,
GLOBAL PRACTICE AND FUTURE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF
COURT AGREEMENTS (2007).
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proliferation of requests for negative declaratory judgments
(e.g., a declaration in favor of a party who expects to be sued
in another forum that the party bringing the request has no
legal obligations to the other persons).
Both approaches create opportunities and incentives for
strategic forum shopping, and neither approach necessarily
directs litigation to the forum most suited to dispute
resolution in a particular case. Both add to the advantages
that a well-funded party has over a less affluent party.
Parallel proceedings in the courts of two or more states
can and do result from jurisdictional rules that
(appropriately) provide multiple judicial fora for the
resolution of a single cross-border dispute. The differences in
approaches across legal systems to such parallel litigation
suggest the value of an international legal instrument that
would move the same or related litigation to a “better forum.”
But the determination of the “better forum” does not, and
should not, require engaging in the complex and difficult
enterprise of mandating or prohibiting preexisting national
jurisdiction rules. At the same time, this determination under
such an instrument should be accomplished in a manner that
will provide far more direction and specificity than are found
in existing common law forum non conveniens regimes.
No legal system currently resolves the problem of parallel
proceedings with any great distinction, and certainly not in a
way that is useful on a global scale. We desperately need fresh
thought, unfettered by the shibboleths of past practice or
decrepit dogma. The Hague Conference has a once-in-ageneration opportunity to engage in a critical examination of
the area, without preconceptions, with due regard to
empirical reality, and from the ground up. Whether it will
meet that challenge remains to be seen.

